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Abstract
The standard definition of quantum state randomization, which is the
quantum analog of the classical one-time pad, consists in applying some
transformation to the quantum message conditioned on a classical secret
key k. We investigate encryption schemes in which this transformation is
conditioned on a quantum encryption key state ρk instead of a classical
string, and extend this symmetric-key scheme to an asymmetric-key model
in which copies of the same encryption key ρk may be held by several
different people, but maintaining information-theoretical security.
We find bounds on the message size and the number of copies of the
encryption key which can be safely created in these two models in terms of
the entropy of the decryption key, and show that the optimal bound can
be asymptotically reached by a scheme using classical encryption keys.
This means that the use of quantum states as encryption keys does not
allow more of these to be created and shared, nor encrypt larger messages,
than if these keys are purely classical.
1 Introduction
1.1 Quantum Encryption
To encrypt a quantum state σ, the standard procedure consists in applying some
(unitary) transformation Uk to the state, which depends on a classical string
k. This string serves as secret key, and anyone who knows this key can per-
form the reverse operation and obtain the original state. If the transformations
U1, U2, . . . are chosen with probabilities p1, p2, . . . , such that when averaged
over all possible choices of key,
R(σ) =
∑
k
pkUkσU
†
k , (1)
the result looks random, i.e., close to the fully mixed state, R(σ) ≈ I/d, this
cipher can safely be transmitted on an insecure channel. This procedure is
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called approximate quantum state randomization or approximate quantum one-
time pad [1, 2, 3] or quantum one-time pad, quantum Vernam cipher or quantum
private channel in the case of perfect security [4, 5, 6], and is the quantum
equivalent of the classical one-time pad.
An encryption scheme which uses such a randomization procedure is called
symmetric, because the same key is used to encrypt and decrypt the message.
An alternative paradigm is asymmetric-key cryptography, in which a different
key is used for encryption and decryption. In such a cryptosystem the encryption
key may be shared amongst many different people, because possessing this key
is not sufficient to perform the reverse operation, decryption. This can be
seen as a natural extension of symmetric-key cryptography, because this latter
corresponds to the special case in which the encryption and decryption keys are
identical and can be shared with only one person.
Although the encryption model given in Eq. (1) is symmetric, by replacing
the classical encryption key with a quantum state we can make it asymmetric.
To see this, let us rewrite Eq. (1) as
R(σ) =
∑
k
pk trK
[
U
(
|k〉〈k|K ⊗ σS
)
U †
]
, (2)
where U :=
∑
k |k〉〈k| ⊗ Uk. The encryption key in Eq. (2), |k〉〈k|, is diagonal
in the computational basis, i.e., classical, but an arbitrary quantum state, ρk,
could be used instead, e.g.,
R(σ) =
∑
k
pk trK
[
U
(
ρKk ⊗ σS
)
U †
]
, (3)
for some set of quantum encryption keys {ρk}k.
If the sender only holds such a quantum encryption key state ρk without
knowing the corresponding decryption key k, then the resulting model is asym-
metric in the sense that possessing this copy of the encryption key state is enough
to perform the encryption, but not to decrypt. So many different people can hold
copies of the encryption key without compromising the security of the scheme.
It is generally impossible to distinguish between non-orthogonal quantum states
with certainty (we refer to the textbook by Nielsen and Chuang [7] for an in-
troduction to quantum information), so measuring a quantum state cannot tell
us precisely what it is, and possessing a copy of the encryption key state does
not allow us to know how the quantum message got transformed, making it
impossible to guess the message, except with exponentially small probability.
Up to roughly logN copies of a state can be needed to discriminate between
N possible states [8], so such a scheme could allow the same encryption key to
be used several times, if multiple copies of this quantum key state are shared
with any party wishing to encrypt a message. The scheme will stay secure as
long as the number of copies created stays below a certain threshold. What
is more, the security which can be achieved is information-theoretic like for
standard quantum state randomization schemes [9], not computational like most
asymmetric-key encryption schemes.
Such an asymmetric-key cryptosystem is just a possible application of a
quantum state randomization scheme which uses quantum keys. It is also in-
teresting to study quantum state randomization with quantum keys for itself
(in the symmetric-key model), without considering other parties holding extra
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copies of the same encryption key. In this paper we study these schemes in both
the symmetric-key and asymmetric-key models, and compare their efficiency
in terms of message size and number of usages of the same encryption key to
quantum state randomization schemes which use only classical keys.
1.2 Related Work
Quantum one-time pads were first proposed in [4, 5] for perfect security, then
approximate security was considered in, e.g., [1, 2, 3]. All these schemes assume
the sender and receiver share some secret classical string which is used only
once to perform the encryption. We extend these models in the symmetric-key
case by conditioning the encryption operation on a quantum key and considering
security with multiple uses of the same key, and then in the asymmetric-key case
by considering security with multiple users holding copies of the same encryption
key.
The first scheme using quantum keys in an asymmetric-key model was pro-
posed by Kawachi et al. [10], although they considered the restricted scenario
of classical messages. Their scheme can encrypt a 1 bit classical message, and
their security proof is computational, as it reduces the task of breaking the
scheme to a graph automorphism problem. They extended their scheme to a
multi-bit version [11], but without security proof. Hayashi et al. [9] then gave
an information-theoretical security proof for [11]. The quantum asymmetric-key
model we consider is a generalization and extension of that of [10, 11].
1.3 Main Contributions
The main result of this paper is that using quantum encryption keys has no
advantage over classical keys with respect to the number of copies of the en-
cryption key which can be safely created and to the size of the messages which
can be encrypted, both in the symmetric and asymmetric-key models. Contrary
to what was believed and motivated previous works with quantum keys, the in-
trinsic indistinguishability of quantum states does not allow more of these to be
created and shared as encryption keys, than if these keys are purely classical.
To show this, we first find an upper bound on the quantum message size and
on the number of copies of the encryption key which can be securely produced.
We show that if t copies of the key are created and if the quantum messages
encrypted are of dimension d, then they have to be such that t log d . H(K) for
the scheme to be secure, where H (K) is the entropy of the decryption key.
We then construct a quantum state randomization scheme and show that
it meets this upper bound in both the symmetric and asymmetric-key models.
The encryption keys this scheme uses are however all diagonal in the same
bases, i.e., classical. This means that the scheme with classical keys is optimal
in terms of message size and number of usages of the same key, and no scheme
with quantum keys can perform better.
We also show how to extend quantum asymmetric-key encryption schemes
for classical message (such as [11]) to encrypt quantum messages as well. To do
this, we combine these schemes for classical messages with a standard quantum
one-time pad, and prove that the resulting scheme is still secure.
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1.4 Organization of the Paper
In Section 2 we develop the encryption models with quantum keys sketched
in this introduction. We first redefine quantum state randomization schemes
using quantum keys instead of classical keys in Section 2.1 and generalize the
standard security definition for multiple usage of the same key in this symmetric-
key model. In Section 2.2 we then show how to construct an asymmetric-key
cryptosystem using such a quantum state randomization scheme with quantum
keys and define its security. Section 2.3 contains a few notes about the special
case of classical messages, which are relevant for the rest of the paper.
In Section 3 we find an upper bound on the message size and number of
copies of the encryption key which can be created, both for the symmetric and
asymmetric-key models.
In Section 4 we construct a quantum state randomization scheme which uses
classical encryption keys, but which meets the optimality bounds for quantum
keys from the previous section in both models. We give this construction in
three steps. First in Section 4.1 we construct a scheme which can randomize
classical messages only. Then in Section 4.2 we show how to combine this scheme
for classical messages with a standard approximate quantum one-time pad to
randomize any quantum state. And finally in Section 4.3 we calculate the key
size of the scheme proposed and show that it corresponds to the bound found
in Section 3.
We conclude in Section 5 with a brief summary and further comments about
the results.
2 Encryption Model
2.1 Quantum Encryption Keys
Let us consider a setting in which we have two parties, a sender and a receiver,
who wish to transmit a quantum state, σ, from one to the other in a secure
way over an insecure channel. If they share a secret classical string, k, they
can apply some completely positive, trace-preserving (CPTP) map Ek to the
quantum message and send the cipher Ek(σ). If the key k was chosen with
probability pk, to any person who does not know this key the transmitted state
is
R(σ) =
∑
k
pkEk(σ), (4)
which will look random for “well chosen” maps Ek. This is the most general
from of quantum state randomization [6].
If instead the sender has a quantum state ρk, he can apply some CPTP map
E to both the shared state and the quantum message, and send E(ρk ⊗ σ). So
for someone who does not know ρk the state sent is
R(σ) =
∑
k
pkE(ρk ⊗ σ). (5)
It is clear that Eqs. (4) and (5) produce equivalent ciphers, because for every
set of CPTP maps {Ek}k there exists a map E and set of states {ρk}k such that
for all messages σ, Ek(σ) = E(ρk ⊗ σ), and vice versa. The difference lies in
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the knowledge needed to perform the encryption. In the first case (Eq. (4))
the sender needs to know the secret key k to know which CPTP map Ek to
apply. In the second case (Eq. (5)) the sender only needs to hold a copy of
the encryption key ρk, he does not need to know what it is or what secret
key k it corresponds to. This allows us to construct in Section 2.2 a quantum
asymmetric-key cryptosystem in which copies of the same encryption key ρk can
be used by many different users. In this section we focus on the symmetric-key
model and define quantum state randomization (QSR) schemes with quantum
encryption keys and their security in this model.
Definition 1. Let B(H) denote the set of linear operators on H.
A quantum state randomization (QSR) scheme with quantum encryption
keys consists of the following tuple,
T = (PK, {ρk}k∈K, E) .
ρk ∈ B(HK) are density operators on a Hilbert space HK . They are called
encryption keys and are indexed by elements k ∈ K called decryption keys.
PK(·) is a probability distribution over the set of decryption keys K, corre-
sponding to the probability with which each en/decryption key-pair should be
chosen.
E : B(HK⊗HS)→ B(HC), is a completely positive, trace-preserving (CPTP)
map from the set of linear operators on the joint system of encryption key and
message Hilbert spaces, HK and HS respectively, to the set of linear operators
on the cipher Hilbert space HC , and is called encryption operator.
To encrypt a quantum message given by its density operator σ ∈ B(HS)
with the encryption key ρk, the encryption operator is applied to the key and
message, resulting in the cipher
ρk,σ := E(ρk ⊗ σ).
Definition 1 describes how to encrypt a quantum message, but for such a
scheme to be useful, it must also be possible to decrypt the message for someone
who knows which key k was used, i.e., it must be possible to invert the encryption
operation.
Definition 2. A QSR scheme given by the tuple T = (PK, {ρk}k∈K, E) is said
to be invertible on the set S ⊆ B(HS) if for every k ∈ K with PK(k) > 0 there
exists a CPTP map Dk : B(HC) → B(HS) such that for all density operators
σ ∈ S,
DkE(ρk ⊗ σ) = σ.
Furthermore, a QSR scheme must – as its name says – randomize a quantum
state. We define this in the same way as previous works on approximate quan-
tum state randomization [1, 2, 3], by bounding the distance between the ciphers
averaged over all possible choices of key and some state independent from the
message. We however generalize this to encrypt t messages with the same key,
because the asymmetric-key model we define Section 2.2 will need this. It is al-
ways possible to consider the case t = 1 in the symmetric-key model, if multiple
uses of the same key are not desired.
We will use the trace norm as distance measure between two states, because
it is directly related to the probability that an optimal measurement can dis-
tinguish between these two states, and is therefore meaningful in the context of
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eavesdropping. The trace norm of a matrix A is defined by ‖A‖tr := tr |A| =
tr
√
A†A, which is also equal to the sum of the singular values of A.
Definition 3. A QSR scheme given by the tuple T = (PK, {ρk}k∈K, E) is
said to be (t, ǫ)-randomizing on the set S ⊆ B(HS) if there exists a density
operator τ ∈ B (H⊗tC ) such that for all t-tuples of message density operators
ω = (σ1, . . . , σt) ∈ S×t
‖R(ω)− τ‖tr ≤ ǫ, (6)
where R(ω) =∑k PK(k)ρk,σ1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ ρk,σt and ρk,σi = E(ρk ⊗ σi).
2.2 Quantum Asymmetric-Key Cryptosystem
As announced in the previous section, the idea behind the quantum asymmetric-
key cryptosystem model is that many different people hold a copy of some
quantum state ρk which serves as encryption key, and anyone who wishes to
send a message to the originator of the encryption keys uses a quantum state
randomization scheme, as described in Definition 1. This is depicted in Figure 1.
Figure 1: Quantum asymmetric-key cryptosystem model. Bob and Charlie hold
copies of Alice’s encryption key ρk. To send her a message, they encrypt it with
the key and a given QSR scheme, and send the resulting cipher to her. An
eavesdropper, Eve, may intercept the ciphers as well as possess some copies of
the encryption key herself.
If the QSR scheme used to encrypt the messages is (t, ǫ)-randomizing and
no more than t copies of the encryption key were released, an eavesdropper who
intercepts the ciphers will not be able to distinguish them from some state in-
dependent from the messages, so not get any information about these messages.
This is however not the only attack he may perform.
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As we consider a scenario in which copies of the encryption key are shared
between many different people, the adversary could hold one or many of them.
If a total of t copies of the encryption key were produced and t1 were used to
encrypt messages ω = (σ1, . . . , σt1), in the worst case we have to assume that
the adversary has the t2 := t − t1 remaining unused copies of the key. So his
total state is
ρEω :=
∑
k∈K
PK(k)ρk,σ1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ ρk,σt1 ⊗ ρ⊗t2k , (7)
where ρk,σi is the cipher of the message σi encrypted with the key ρk. This
leads to the following security definition.
Definition 4. We call a quantum asymmetric-key cryptosystem (t, ǫ)-indistin-
guishable on the set S ⊆ B(HS) if for all t1 ∈ {0, 1, . . . , t}, t2 := t − t1, there
exists a density operator τ ∈ B (H⊗t1C ⊗H⊗t2K ) such that for all t1-tuples of
message density operators ω = (σ1, . . . , σt1) ∈ S×t1 ,∥∥ρEω − τ∥∥tr ≤ ǫ,
where ρEω is the state the adversary obtains as defined in Eq. (7).
Remark 5. Definition 4 is clearly more general than the security criteria of
Definition 3 ((t, ǫ)-randomization) as this latter corresponds to the special case
t1 = t. However, for the scheme constructed in Section 4 the two are equivalent,
and proving one proves the other. This is the case in particular if the encryption
key is equal to the cipher of some specific message σ0, i.e., ρk = ρk,σ0 = E(ρk ⊗
σ0), in which case holding an extra copy of the encryption key does not give
more information about the decryption key than holding an extra cipher state.
2.3 Classical Messages
In the following sections we will also be interested in the special case of schemes
which encrypt classical messages only. Classical messages can be represented by
a set of mutually orthogonal quantum states, which we will take to be the basis
states of the message Hilbert space and denote by {|s〉}s∈S . So these schemes
must be invertible and randomizing on the set of basis states of the message
Hilbert space.
When considering classical messages only, we will simplify the notation when
possible and represent a message by a string s instead of by its density matrix
|s〉〈s|, e.g., the cipher of the message s encrypted with the key ρk is
ρk,s := E (ρk ⊗ |s〉〈s|) .
Remark 6. Definition 2 (invertibility) can be simplified when only classical
messages are considered: a QSR scheme given by the tuple T = (PK, {ρk}k∈K, E)
is invertible for the set of classical messages S, if for every k ∈ K with PK(k) > 0
the ciphers {ρk,s}s∈S are mutually orthogonal, where ρk,s := E (ρk ⊗ |s〉〈s|) for
some orthonormal basis {|s〉}s∈S of the message Hilbert space HS .
We will also use a different but equivalent definition to measure how well a
scheme can randomize a message when dealing with classical messages. This
new security criteria allows us to simplify some proofs.
7
Definition 7. A QSR scheme given by the tuple T = (PK, {ρk}k∈K, E) is said
to be (t, ǫ)-secure for the set of classical messages S if for all probability distri-
butions PSt(·) over the set of t-tuples of messages S×t,∥∥∥ρStCt − ρSt ⊗ ρCt∥∥∥
tr
≤ ǫ, (8)
where ρS
tCt is the state of the joint systems of t-fold message and cipher Hilbert
spaces, and ρS
t
and ρC
t
are the result of tracing out the cipher respectively
message systems. I.e.,
ρS
tCt =
∑
s∈S×t
PSt(s)|s〉〈s| ⊗
∑
k∈K
PK(k)ρk,s1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ ρk,st ,
ρS
t
=
∑
s∈S×t
PSt(s)|s〉〈s|,
ρC
t
=
∑
s∈S×t
PSt(s)
∑
k∈K
PK(k)ρk,s1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ ρk,st ,
where s = (s1, . . . , st).
This security definition can be interpreted the following way. No matter
what the probability distribution on the secret messages is – let the adversary
choose it – the message and cipher spaces are nearly in product form, i.e., the
cipher gives next to no information about the message.
The following lemma proves that this new security definition is equivalent
to the previous one (Definition 3) up to a constant factor.
Lemma 8. If a QSR scheme is (t, ǫ)-randomizing for a set of classical messages
S, then it is (t, 2ǫ)-secure for S. If a QSR scheme is (t, ǫ)-secure for a set of
classical messages S, then it is (t, 2ǫ)-randomizing for S.
Proof. In order to simplify the notation we will set s := (s1, . . . , st) and ρk,s :=
ρk,s1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ ρk,st . The left-hand side of Eq. (8) can then be rewritten as∥∥∥ρStCt − ρSt ⊗ ρCt∥∥∥
tr
=
∥∥∥∥∥
∑
s∈S×t
PSt(s)|s〉〈s| ⊗
∑
k∈K
PK(k)ρk,s
−
∑
s∈S×t
PSt(s)|s〉〈s| ⊗
∑
r∈S×t
k∈K
PK(k)PSt(r)ρk,r
∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥
tr
=
∑
s∈S×t
PSt(s)
∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥
∑
k∈K
PK(k)ρk,s −
∑
r∈S×t
k∈K
PK(k)PSt(r)ρk,r
∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥
tr
. (9)
If this must be less than ǫ for all probability distributions PSt then for the
distribution PSt(s1) = PSt(s2) = 1/2 for any two elements s1, s2 ∈ S×t we have
from Eq. (9)
1
2
∥∥∥∥∥
∑
k∈K
PK(k)ρk,s1 −
∑
k∈K
PK(k)ρk,s2
∥∥∥∥∥
tr
≤ ǫ.
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This immediately implies (t, 2ǫ)-randomization.
To prove the converse we apply the triangle inequality to Eq. (9) and get∥∥∥ρStCt − ρSt ⊗ ρCt∥∥∥
tr
≤
∑
s∈S×t
PSt(s)
∑
r∈S×t
PSt(r)
∥∥∥∥∥
∑
k∈K
PK(k)ρk,s −
∑
k∈K
PK(k)ρk,r
∥∥∥∥∥
tr
.
By the definition of (t, ǫ)-randomization (Definition 3) and the triangle inequal-
ity we know that ∥∥∥∥∥
∑
k∈K
PK(k)ρk,s −
∑
k∈K
PK(k)ρk,r
∥∥∥∥∥
tr
≤ 2ǫ,
for all r, s ∈ S×t, which concludes the proof.
3 Lower bounds on the Key Size
It is intuitively clear that the more copies of the encryption key state ρk are
created, the more information the adversary gets about the decryption key k ∈ K
and the more insecure the scheme becomes. As it turns out, the number of copies
of the encryption key which can be safely used is directly linked to the size of
the decryption key, i.e., the cardinality of the decryption key set K.
Let us assume a QSR scheme with quantum encryption keys is used to
encrypt classical messages of size m. Then if t copies of the encryption key
state are released and used, the size of the total message encrypted with the
same decryption key k is tm. We prove in this section that the decryption key
has to be of the same size as the total message to achieve information-theoretical
security, i.e., log |K| & tm. In Section 4 we then give a scheme which reaches
this bound asymptotically.
Theorem 9. If a QSR scheme given by the tuple T = (PK, {ρk}k∈K, E) is in-
vertible for the set of classical messages S, then when t messages (s1, . . . , st) are
chosen from S with (joint) probability distribution PSt(s1, . . . , st) and encrypted
with the same key,∥∥∥ρStCt − ρSt ⊗ ρCt∥∥∥
tr
≥ H(S
t)−H(K) − 2
4t log |S| , (10)
where H(·) is the Shannon entropy and ρStCt is the state of the t-fold message
and cipher systems:
ρS
tCt =
∑
s∈S×t
PSt(s)|s〉〈s| ⊗
∑
k∈K
PK(k)ρk,s1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ ρk,st ,
ρS
t
=
∑
s∈S×t
PSt(s)|s〉〈s|,
ρC
t
=
∑
s∈S×t
PSt(s)
∑
k∈K
PK(k)ρk,s1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ ρk,st ,
(11)
where s = (s1, . . . , st).
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Proof. A theorem by Alicki and Fanes [12] tells us that for any two states ρAB
and σAB on the joint system HAB = HA ⊗ HB with δ := ‖ρAB − σAB‖tr ≤ 1
and dA := dimHA,∣∣S (ρAB∣∣ρB)− S (σAB∣∣σB)∣∣ ≤ 4δ log dA + 2h (δ) , (12)
where S
(
ρAB
∣∣ρB) := S (ρAB)−S (ρB) is the conditional Von Neumann entropy
and h(p) := p log 1
p
+ (1 − p) log 11−p is the binary entropy. h(δ) ≤ 1, so from
Eq. (12) we get
∥∥ρAB − σAB∥∥
tr
≥
∣∣S (ρAB∣∣ρB)− S (σAB∣∣σB)∣∣− 2
4 log dA
.
By applying this to the left-hand side of Eq. (10) we obtain
∥∥∥ρStCt − ρSt ⊗ ρCt∥∥∥
tr
≥
S
(
ρS
t
)
+ S
(
ρC
t
)
− S
(
ρS
tCt
)
− 2
4t log |S| .
To prove this theorem it remains to show that
S
(
ρS
t
)
+ S
(
ρC
t
)
− S
(
ρS
tCt
)
≥ H (St)−H(K) .
For this we will need the two following bounds on the Von Neumann entropy
(see e.g, [7]):
S
(∑
x∈X
pxρx
)
≥
∑
x∈X
px S (ρx) ,
S
(∑
x∈X
pxρx
)
≤ H(X ) +
∑
x∈X
px S (ρx) .
Equality is obtained in the second equation if the states {ρx}x∈X are all mutually
orthogonal. By using these bounds and Eq. (11) we see that
S
(
ρS
tCt
)
= H
(St)+ ∑
s∈S×t
PSt(s) S
(∑
k∈K
PK(k)ρk,s1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ ρk,st
)
≤ H (St)+H(K) + ∑
s∈S×t
k∈K
PK(k)PSt(s) S (ρk,s1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ ρk,st) ,
S
(
ρS
t
)
= H
(St) ,
S
(
ρC
t
)
≥
∑
k∈K
PK(k) S
( ∑
s∈S×t
PSt(s)ρk,s1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ ρk,st
)
= H
(St)+ ∑
s∈S×t
k∈K
PK(k)PSt(s) S (ρk,s1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ ρk,st) .
We have equality in the last line because the scheme is invertible on S, i.e., by
Definition 2 and Remark 6 the states {ρk,s1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ ρk,st}s1,...,st∈S are mutually
orthogonal. By putting this all together we conclude the proof.
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Corollary 10. For a QSR scheme to be (t, ǫ)-randomizing or (t, ǫ)-indistin-
guishable, it is necessary that
H(K) ≥ (1− 8ǫ)t log d− 2, (13)
where d is the dimension of the message Hilbert space HS and H(K) is the
entropy of the decryption key.
Proof. Definition 7 says that for a scheme to be (t, ǫ)-secure we need∥∥∥ρStCt − ρSt ⊗ ρCt∥∥∥
tr
≤ ǫ
for all probability distributions PSt . So for the uniform distribution we get from
Theorem 9 that for a scheme to be (t, ǫ)-secure we need
H (K) ≥ (1− 4ǫ)t log |S| − 2.
By Lemma 8 we then have the condition
H (K) ≥ (1 − 8ǫ)t log |S| − 2
for the scheme to be (t, ǫ)-randomizing for the classical messages S. And as
classical messages are a subset of quantum messages – namely an orthonormal
basis of the message Hilbert space – this bound extends to the case of quantum
messages on a Hilbert space of dimension dS = |S|.
As (t, ǫ)-randomization is a special case of (t, ǫ)-indistinguishability, namely
for t1 = t, it is immediate that this lower bound also applies to (t, ǫ)-indistin-
guishability.
Remark 11. Approximate quantum one-time pad schemes usually only con-
sider the special case in which the cipher has the same dimension as the mes-
sage [1, 3]. A more general scenario in which an ancilla is appended to the
message is however also possible. It was proven in [6] that for perfect security
such an extended scheme needs a key of the same size as in the restricted sce-
nario, namely 2 log d. Corollary 10 for t = 1 shows the same for approximate
security, namely roughly log d bits of key are necessary, just as when no ancilla
is present.
4 Near-Optimal Scheme
To simplify the presentation of the QSR scheme, we first define it for classical
messages in Section 4.1, show that it is invertible and find a bound on t, the
number of copies of the encryption key which can be released, for it to be (t, ǫ)-
randomizing for an exponentially small ǫ. In Section 4.2 we extend the scheme
to encrypt any quantum message of a given size, and show again that it is
invertible and randomizing. And finally in Section 4.3 we calculate the size of
the key necessary to encrypt a message of a given length, and show that it is
nearly asymptotically equal to the lower bound found in Section 3.
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4.1 Classical Messages
Without loss of generality, let the message space be of dimension dimHS =
2m. The classical messages can then be represented by strings of length m,
S := {0, 1}m. We now define a QSR scheme which uses encryption key states
of dimension dimHK = 2m+n, where n is a security parameter, i.e., the scheme
will be (t, ǫ)-randomizing for ǫ = 2−Θ(n).
We define the set of decryption keys to be the set of all (m × n) binary
matrices,
K := {0, 1}m×n. (14)
This set has size |K| = 2mn and each key is chosen with uniform probability.
For every decryption key A ∈ K the corresponding encryption key is defined
as
ρA :=
1
2n
∑
x∈{0,1}n
|Ax, x〉〈Ax, x|, (15)
where Ax is the multiplication of the matrix A with the vector x.
The encryption operator E : B(HK⊗HS)→ B(HC) consists in applying the
unitary
U :=
∑
x∈{0,1}n
s,y∈{0,1}m
|y ⊕ s, x〉〈y, x|K |s〉〈s|S
and tracing out the message system S, i.e.,
ρA,s := trS
(
U
(
ρKk ⊗ |s〉〈s|S
)
U †
)
.
This results in the cipher for the message s being
ρA,s =
1
2n
∑
x∈{0,1}n
|Ax⊕ s, x〉〈Ax⊕ s, x|. (16)
These states are mutually orthogonal for different messages s so by Remark 6
this scheme is invertible.
We now show that this scheme is (t, ǫ)-randomizing for ǫ = 2−δn+1 and
t = (1− δ)n, 0 < δ < 1.
Theorem 12. For the QSR scheme defined above in Eqs. (14), (15) and (16)
there exists a density operator τ ∈ B(H⊗tC ) such that for all t-tuples of messages
s = (s1, . . . , st) ∈ S×t, if t = (1− δ)n, 0 < δ < 1, then
‖γs − τ‖tr ≤ 2−δn+1,
where γs is the encryption of s with this scheme averaged over all possible keys,
i.e.,
γs =
∑
A∈K
PK(A)ρA,s1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ ρA,st . (17)
Proof. The τ in question is the fully mixed state τ = 1
2t(m+n)
I. By placing the
values of the ciphers from Eq. (16) in Eq. (17) we get
γs =
1
2mn2tn
∑
A∈{0,1}m×n
x1,...,xt∈{0,1}
n
|. . . , Axi ⊕ si, xi, . . . 〉〈. . . , Axi ⊕ si, xi, . . . |.
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A unitary performing bit flips can take γs to γr for any s, r ∈ St, so∥∥∥∥γs − 12t(m+n) I
∥∥∥∥
tr
=
∥∥∥∥γr − 12t(m+n) I
∥∥∥∥
tr
,
and it is sufficient to evaluate∥∥∥∥γ0 − 12t(m+n) I
∥∥∥∥
tr
=
∑
e∈EVec(γ0)
∣∣∣∣we − 12t(n+m)
∣∣∣∣ , (18)
where e are the eigenvectors of γ0 and we the corresponding eigenvalues.
So we need to calculate the eigenvalues of
γ0 =
1
2mn2tn
∑
A∈{0,1}m×n
x1,...,xt∈{0,1}
n
|Ax1, x1, . . . , Axt, xt〉〈Ax1, x1, . . . , Axt, xt|. (19)
Let us fix x1, . . . , xt. It is immediate from the linearity of Ax that if exactly d
of the vectors {xi}ti=1 are linearly independent, then∑
A∈{0,1}m×n
|Ax1, x1, . . . , Axt, xt〉〈Ax1, x1, . . . , Axt, xt|
uniformly spans a space of dimension 2dm, and for different values of x1, . . . , xt
these subspaces are all mutually orthogonal. Let Dt be the random variable
representing the number of independent vectors amongst t binary vectors of
length n, when chosen uniformly at random, and let PDt(d) = Pr[Dt = d] be the
probability that exactly d of these vectors are linearly independent. The matrix
given in Eq. (19) then has exactly 2tnPDt(d)2
dm eigenvectors with eigenvalue
1
2dm2tn
, for 0 ≤ d ≤ t. The remaining eigenvectors have eigenvalue 0.
So Eq. (18) becomes
∑
e∈EVec(ρE0 )
∣∣∣∣we − 12t(m+n)
∣∣∣∣ = 2
t∑
d=0
2tnPDt(d)2
dm
(
1
2dm2tn
− 1
2t(m+n)
)
= 2
t∑
d=0
PDt(d)
(
1− 2−(t−d)m
)
≤ 2
t−1∑
d=0
PDt(d) = 2(1− PDt(t))
≤ 2t−n+1.
For t = (1− δ)n, 0 < δ < 1, we have for all s ∈ St, ‖γs − τ‖tr ≤ 2−δn+1.
Corollary 13. An asymmetric-key cryptosystem using this QSR scheme is
(t, ǫ)-indistinguishable (Definition 4) for ǫ = 2−δn+1 and t = (1−δ)n, 0 < δ < 1.
Proof. As noted in Section 2.2 this scheme is such that the encryption keys are
identical to the ciphers of the message 0, ρk,0 = ρk =
1
2n
∑
x∈{0,1}n |Ax, x〉〈Ax, x|.
So if t1 copies of the encryption key were used to encrypt the messages s =
13
(s1, . . . , st1) and the adversary holds these ciphers and the t2 = t − t1 extra
copies of the encryption key,
ρEs =
∑
k∈K
PK(k)ρk,s1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ ρk, st1 ⊗ ρ⊗t2k .
Then ρEs = γr for r = (s1, . . . , st1 , 0, . . . , 0) and by Theorem 12, ‖γr − τ‖tr ≤
ǫ.
4.2 Quantum Messages
We will now extend the encryption scheme given above to encrypt any quantum
state, not only classical ones. To do this we will show how to combine a QSR
scheme with quantum keys which is (t, ǫ1)-randomizing for classical messages
(like the one from Section 4.1) with a QSR scheme with classical keys which is
(1, ǫ2)-randomizing for quantum states (which is the case of any standard QSR
scheme, e.g., [4, 5, 1, 2, 3, 6]) to produce a QSR scheme which is (t, ǫ1 + tǫ2)-
randomizing. The general idea is to choose a classical key for the second scheme
at random, encrypt the quantum message with this scheme, then encrypt the
classical key with the quantum encryption key of the first scheme, and send
both ciphers.
Theorem 14. Let a QSR scheme with quantum keys be given by the tuple
T1 = (PK, {ρk}k∈K, E), where E : B(HK ⊗ HS) → B(HC), and let a QSR
scheme with classical keys be given by the tuple T2 = (PS , {Fs}s∈S), where
Fs : B(HR) → B(HD). We combine the two to produce the QSR scheme with
quantum encryption keys given by T3 = (PK, {ρk}k∈K,G), where G : B(HK ⊗
HR)→ B(HC ⊗HD) is defined by
G(ρk ⊗ σ) :=
∑
s∈S
PS(s)E (ρk ⊗ |s〉〈s|)⊗Fs(σ). (20)
If T1 forms a quantum asymmetric-key cryptosystem which is invertible and
(t, ǫ1)-indistinguishable (respectively randomizing) for the basis states of HS and
T2 is an invertible and (1, ǫ2)-randomizing QSR scheme for any state on HR,
then T3 forms an invertible and (t, ǫ1 + tǫ2)-indistinguishable (respectively ran-
domizing) cryptosystem for all density operator messages on HR.
Proof. The invertibility of the scheme formed with T3 is immediate. To prove
the indistinguishability we need to show that for all t1 ∈ {0, 1, . . . , t}, t2 :=
t − t1, there exists a density operator τ ∈ B
(H⊗t1C ⊗H⊗t2K ⊗H⊗t1D ) such that
for all t1-tuples of message density operators ω = (σ1, . . . , σt1) ∈ B(HR)×t1 ,
‖ρEω − τ‖tr ≤ ǫ, where ρEω =
∑
k∈K PK(k)G(ρk ⊗ σ1)⊗ · · · ⊗ G(ρk ⊗ σt1)⊗ ρt2k .
Let us write γs :=
∑
k∈K PK(k)ρk,s1⊗· · ·⊗ρk,st1⊗ρ⊗t2k , where s = (s1, . . . , st1)
and ρk,si = E(ρk ⊗ |si〉〈si|), and µσ :=
∑
s∈S PS(s)Fs(σ). And let τ1 and τ2 be
the two states such that ‖γs − τ1‖tr ≤ ǫ1 and ‖µσ − τ2‖tr ≤ ǫ2 for all s and σ
respectively. We define δs := γs − τ1 and τ := τ1 ⊗ τ⊗t12 . Then by the triangle
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inequality and changing the order of the registers
∥∥ρEω − τ∥∥tr ≤
∥∥∥∥∥∥
∑
s∈S×t1
PSt(s)δs ⊗Fs1(σ1)⊗ · · · ⊗ Fst1 (σt1 )
∥∥∥∥∥∥
tr
+
∥∥τ1 ⊗ µσ1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ µσt1 − τ∥∥tr
≤
∑
s∈S×t1
PSt(s)‖δs‖tr +
t1∑
i=1
‖µσi − τ2‖tr
≤ ǫ1 + t1ǫ2.
As (t, ǫ)-randomization is a special case of (t, ǫ)-indistinguishability, namely
for t1 = t, it is immediate from Theorem 14 that T3 is also (t, ǫ1 + tǫ2)-
randomizing.
4.3 Key Size
To construct the QSR scheme for quantum messages as described in Section 4.2
we combine the scheme for classical messages from Section 4.1 and the approx-
imate one-time pad scheme of Dickinson and Nayak [3].
The scheme from Section 4.1 is (t, ǫ1)-randomizing for t = (1 − δ)n and
ǫ1 = 2
−δn+1, and uses a key with entropy H (K) = nm = (t+ log 1
ǫ1
+1)m. The
scheme of Dickinson and Nayak [3] is (1, ǫ2)-randomizing and uses a key with
entropy m = log d + log 1
ǫ2
+ 4 to encrypt a quantum state of dimension d. So
by combining these our final scheme is (t, ǫ1 + tǫ2)-randomizing and uses a key
with entropy
H (K) = (t+ log 1
ǫ1
+ 1)(log d+ log
1
ǫ2
+ 4)
to encrypt t states of dimension d. By choosing ǫ1 and ǫ2 to be polynomial
in 1
t
and 1log d respectively, the key has size H (K) = t log d + o(t log d), which
nearly reaches the asymptotic optimality found in Eq. (13), namely H (K) ≥
(1− 8ǫ)t log d− 2. Exponential security can be achieved at the cost of a slightly
reduced asymptotic efficiency. For ǫ1 = 2
−δ1t and ǫ2 = d
−δ2 for some small
δ1, δ2 > 0, the key has size H (K) = (1 + δ1)(1 + δ2)t log d+ o(t log d).
5 Consequence for Quantum Keys
The scheme presented in Section 4 uses the encryption keys
ρA =
1
2n
∑
x∈{0,1}n
|Ax, x〉〈Ax, x|, (21)
for some (m × n)-matrix decryption key A. Although these keys are written
as quantum states using the bra-ket notation to fit in the framework for QSR
schemes with quantum keys developed in the previous sections, the states from
Eq. (21) are all diagonal in the computational basis. So they are classical and
could have been represented by a classical random variable XA which takes the
value (Ax, x) with probability 2−n.
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This scheme meets the optimality bound on the key size from Section 3.
This bound tells us that for a given set of decryption keys K, no matter how
the encryption keys {ρk}k∈K are constructed, the number of copies of the en-
cryption keys which can be created, t, and the dimension of the messages which
can be encrypted, d, have to be such that t log d . H(K) for the scheme to
be information-theoretically secure. From the construction of the scheme in
Section 4 we know that this bound is met by a scheme using classical keys.
Hence no scheme using quantum keys can perform better. So using quantum
keys in a quantum state randomization scheme has no advantage with respect
to the message size and number of usages of the same key over classical keys.
This result applies to both the symmetric-key and asymmetric-key models as
the optimality was shown with respect to both (t, ǫ)-randomization (Definition 3)
and (t, ǫ)-indistinguishability (Definition 4), the security definitions for the sym-
metric-key and asymmetric-key models respectively.
Quantum keys may however have other advantages over classical keys. For
example, the scheme proposed in Section 4 is not optimal in the dimension of
the encryption keys ρk. If the dimension of these keys can be reduced and
quantum memory becomes the norm, they could be less resource consuming
than classical keys. So encryption schemes using quantum keys cannot yet be
dismissed.
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